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**‘Towards Effective and Legitimate Governance: States Emerging from Hybrid  
Political Orders’**

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**Solomon Islands Report**

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<b>Table of Contents</b>	
<b>Executive Summary and Recommendations</b>	<b>Page i</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>Page 1</b>
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>Page 2</b>
<b>3. Regional and Global Dynamics</b>	<b>Page 3</b>
<b>4. Political economy, Cash Economy, Resource Management</b>	<b>Page 4</b>
<b>5. Peace, Order, Security, Political Stability</b>	<b>Page 7</b>
<b>6. Social Needs and Service Delivery</b>	<b>Page 8</b>
<b>7. Law and Justice, Customary Law, Rule of Law, Regulatory Environment</b>	<b>Page 10</b>
<b>8. Political leadership, Representation and Political Will</b>	<b>Page 12</b>
<b>9. Participation and Inclusion in Decision-making, Voice and Accountability</b>	<b>Page 15</b>
<b>10. Citizenship, Wantokism, “Islandism”</b>	<b>Page 18</b>
<b>Acronyms</b>	<b>Page 19</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>Page 19</b>
<b>Annex 1: Burnscreek Community</b>	<b>Page 21</b>
<b>Annex 2: Name Abbreviations of Interviewees</b>	<b>Page 23</b>
<b>Annex 3: People consulted in the Solomon Islands, Honiara August 2007</b>	<b>Page 24</b>
<b>Annex 4: Consultation Visits to Malaita Province, August 2007</b>	<b>Page 26</b>
<b>Annex 5: Consultations in Western and Makira Ulawa Provinces September/October 2007<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Page 27</b>

## **Executive Summary and Recommendations**

The enhancement of state effectiveness should begin paradoxically with an understanding of the diverse communities that constitute each state system. Shifting the focus from state institutions and analyzing sources of community strength, resilience and security (and the traditional values, customs, beliefs that underpin them) will help generate a better sense of “grounded legitimacy” which is a pre-requisite for the development of more effective political and judicial institutions in post colonial states.

Ever since the tensions of 1998-2003, Solomon Islands has been identified by the international community as a “fragile state”. Yet despite this label the vast majority of Solomon Islanders have managed to continue their everyday lives relatively undisturbed from

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<sup>1</sup> This is the shortened version of a much more comprehensive report submitted to AusAID in January 2008. The longer version addresses in more detail the contributions and attitudes of the actors from government, civil society and the sphere of custom with regard to the fields of governance analysed (political economy, order and security etc.). It provides a more detailed presentation of the specific views of actors from the different spheres, based on the interviews conducted during field trips to Solomon Islands in August, September and October 2007.

the tensions. This report explores what it is that enables “strong but stressed” communities to function in the face of “state weakness” and adverse environments. In particular it explores whether a focus on custom, can help us understand some of the deeper continuities in Solomons political dynamics and how these might be harnessed to develop political institutions that connect more organically to different Solomons cultural systems than the post-colonial system currently in place.

It is appropriate to do this because customary chiefs, village elders and others in the Solomons are asking how they can utilise their traditional wisdom and legitimacy to facilitate creative change and play a “positive” role in development and state formation processes.

### **Political Economy:**

Solomon Islands’ economy is based on primary commodities from agriculture, forestry, mining and fishing. It has been recovering since the civil conflict; however it remains the poorest economy in the region and is heavily dependent on logging and aid. While economic growth is currently robust and inflation began to ease in 2006, the per capita income is still at two-thirds of its pre-conflict level. The government sector occupies 70-80 percent of the economy and 90 percent of service delivery such as medical services which are resourced by aid donors.

The private sector is relatively small and its contribution to the tax base is therefore also relatively small. The Government revenue continues to be lost through limited capacity to collect taxes on logging exports and fishing. Food consumes more than half of average household incomes. Generally low wages have not kept up with the cost of living, and inequalities are widening in the Solomon Islands with low wages in sharp contrast to some executive salaries, such as the SB\$1.3m a year salary offered to Solomon Airline's new financial controller.

### **Recommendation:**

1. It is vital that all external donors ensure that the subsistence economy in the Solomons is as strong as it can be because this is the sector that provides the most basic safety net for individuals and villages. Viable subsistence systems are a pre-requisite for other types of economic or social development. The private sector, the village, the state and civil society have to ensure that economic decisions they take will benefit the whole population as opposed to specific interests. This is especially so in relation to logging revenues, mineral development and fishing.

### **Order and Security:**

For the most part, Solomon Islands is peaceful and safe for its citizens, though there are some law and order problems in the country and Honiara is beginning to experience growing crime rates as its population expands. Most people however, reported that village life is better than town life because it is safe. Safety in the villages is provided by the proximity of large extended family networks and also by customary leaders. Money problems and isolation from protective or restraining kin networks were blamed for increasing trouble in towns. This suggests strongly that basic social order, the settlement of personal grievances and the maintenance of social harmony is rooted much more in the customary realm than in the “rational-legal” realm.

Where strong and resilient communities are functioning well they are largely self regulating. Social order, and the delicate reciprocal exchanges that lie at the heart of Melanesian “harmony” depend on a detailed knowledge and internalisation of custom; custodians of that

custom and individuals who respect it believe that harmony is more likely to flow from compliance rather than resistance to it.

***Recommendation:***

2. In the absence of effective, capable or well regarded political institutions, most social order, peace and political stability will be generated largely by customary groups, and civil society organizations, especially the churches. It is vital, therefore, that these institutions are more widely acknowledged and strengthened in policy discussions about policing, law and order and the delivery and administration of justice.

**Social needs and Service Delivery:**

The motto of the Solomon Islands government is ‘To lead is to serve’ which reflects a strongly held cultural value – that Solomon Islanders live for other people. This notion embodies traditional norms of reciprocity and is the basis for what social welfare exists in the Solomons – welfare provided mostly by kin. While this motto forms the basis of a code of ethics for politicians, it becomes problematic when the sharing of “public largesse” by parliamentarians and government workers is expected by many people. There is, therefore, a need to work towards a clearer division of responsibility between customary and governmental delivery of services.

***Recommendation:***

3. High level and immediate attention needs to be directed to ways in which religious institutions, customary leaders and key civil society organizations like Transparency International, can jointly address and challenge corruption at local, provincial and national levels.

Schools are run by a plethora of authorities. A particular issue that confronts diverse providers in education is the need for coordination between state and non-state players in the provision of education.

The revised National Health Strategy 2006-10 provides a structure for communication with partners in health service delivery, including churches and NGOs. All partners suffer, however, from a lack of capacity, which underscores the need to work together. The government supports about 90 percent of the church health services. Women’s groups also support Ministry of Health projects Other NGO groups also have complementary programs.

***Recommendation:***

4. There are serious gaps and deficiencies in the Government’s capacity to gather the necessary resources and allocate them in ways that will boost the delivery of basic education, health and welfare in the Solomon context. There is an urgent need, therefore, to determine whether it might be better to expand external financial support to churches and capable civil society groups in the provision of basic medical and educational services to peripheral regions and within Honiara itself.

One of the greatest social needs in the Solomon Islands is for appropriate development that can encourage people to remain in rural areas, while giving them access to appropriate education, incomes and facilities for a reasonable standard of living, one which will enable payment for needs such as health, education and recreation.

### ***Recommendation:***

5. In all development planning closer attention needs to be paid to the needs of rural locality so that the village becomes as attractive to citizens as is the urban area. This means making more services available to villages and provinces and thinking seriously about ways of enhancing “modern” recreational opportunities within villages to diminish the lure of cities.

### **Law and Justice:**

There are three very different concepts of justice, all of which are in play in the Solomons at the present time.

(i) **Legal Justice** refers to all written formal law which is imposed by the state. It rests heavily on concepts of universality, citizenship and of sovereign equality under the law. It draws heavily on liberal principles and concepts of individual rights and freedoms. “Legal” justice means that all citizens irrespective of rank or status are equally accountable under the law for their behaviour.

(ii) **“Customary” Justice** rests heavily on what is known as customary law which is a body of largely unwritten rules and principles which applies to particular communities for the settlement of disputes, grievances and complaints. It is variable and localized and while it might generate high levels of harmony it might also be somewhat conservative, hierarchical and patriarchal.

(iii) **Social Justice** is characterized by rule of law (procedural justice) and fair distribution of resources and opportunities in society (substantive justice) Principles of distributive justice that reduce inequality in resources vary between cultures and societies as the principles of what are considered fair and the realities of power vary enormously.

### ***Recommendations:***

6. The Solomon Islands is a hybrid legal system in formation. Customary law, despite colonialism and post-independence tensions, has remained strong and vital. It is vital, therefore, for donors and others to continue reinforcing the Chief Justice, and others in highlighting the importance of customary law (especially in relation to land disputes) and what this might mean for the jurisdictional privileges of both the formal and informal legal systems.
7. Chiefs should be paid for doing “judicial” work, even if they are doing it according to customary principles.
8. While the informal “judicial” sphere needs to become more accountable for its actions and decisions there is much to be gained by allocating some clear jurisdictional rights to the informal and formal spheres in a spirit of complementarity, even though there are areas of incompatibility in relation to law and justice. Most islanders prefer to manage grievances by traditional rather than legal means. Most prefer to apply traditional punishments and remedies and there is deep ambivalence about retributive as opposed to restorative justice.

### **Leadership and Representation:**

Throughout the Solomons there is considerable diversity in what is understood by customary leadership. This gives rise to conceptual and sometimes actual confusion about who is a traditional leader and why. This is because customary leadership can be achieved through a

mix of inherited rights, personal abilities and achievements. The authority of most Solomon customary leaders relates to their land owning descent groups, their knowledge of local custom and history, particular skills and long connection with their communities. Some customary chiefs balance different roles, combining roles from the traditional village sphere and the sphere of the state.

***Recommendation:***

9. It is important to identify who is a customary leader and how these persons might better utilise custom to generate resilient social systems at village, provincial and national levels. The Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu) have had some experience of dealing with this problem and (subject to an invitation from their Solomon Island counterparts) could be invited to share their experiences on how to enhance the capacities of customary leaders at micro, meso and macro levels.

Attention should be given (by constitutional reformers and others) to ways in which traditional leaders might be able to provide significant checks and balances and generate higher levels of accountability on political and judicial decision-making within the formal sector.

The Constitutional Reform Unit in the Prime Minister's Department has been developing a range of new models that might engage customary chiefs more fully into legislative processes. One suggestion is that customary chiefs should be involved in the legislative process at the State/Parliament level, though it has also been suggested that the chiefs be given a consultative role rather than a political or legislative role. This model is aimed at better using chiefs as critical resources for effective local governance while simultaneously bringing greater transparency and accountability to government. Currently, only a few Members of Parliament consult with chiefs in their constituency.

Most people (especially those living outside of Honiara) have a very vague concept of what the government is or does, because its reach is limited, its representatives have little or no contact with citizens, the services provided are minimal and it is not considered either trustworthy or reliable. Because of this, most citizens prefer traditional mechanisms of governance to formal state institutions, with the result that formal government institutions in the Solomons appears to be an abstract and somewhat epiphenomenal system in relation to their daily work and activities.

***Recommendation:***

10. There is an urgent need for higher levels of collaboration between elected members of parliament and customary leaders and a deeper appreciation of the contribution that a range of civil society organizations (particularly churches) can play in relation to community development, governance and conflict resolution.

## **Participation and Inclusion**

Another weakness in the current division of provincial and national political responsibilities is that donors often bypass the provinces. This means that provincial authorities are often unaware of what projects are being proposed and their implications for the locality. It is a widely held perception in communities that it would be more effective to make more use of localised governance, including chiefs, and generate more effective provincial governance. Links between the Solomons government and its people are generally quite weak. Members of Parliament rarely visit their constituency, appearing only during election campaigns, often

with plenty of money or goods to distribute to those promising to vote for them. Often however, the benefits promised by the Parliamentarians if re-elected are not delivered. While chiefs, pastors or elders help deal with local political issues, government politics usually come into play only at election time. Weak though the links may be between people and politics, there is some effort from community members to influence politicians.

Creating space for communities to become more engaged with governance is a challenge in the Solomon Islands. Input from people and organizations at the grass roots are rarely welcomed in the current government climate although there may be higher levels of responsiveness under the Sikua administration.

### ***Recommendations:***

11. The narrowness of the tax base is a major barrier to successful western-style governance and raises some questions about the relationship between taxation and representation. It would be worthwhile generating some high level discussions within the Solomons about the meaning of citizenship and political accountability under largely subsistence conditions, in particular with regard to the question of how Solomon Islanders can begin playing more active citizenship roles in relation to government policy making, administration and the rule of law.

12. It would be worthwhile for donors, the Solomons Government, churches, customary and civil society leaders organising some national level Summit discussions about how to incorporate family, kin, *wantok* and community much more directly into the reworking of the Solomons Independence Constitution. Such discussions might focus attention on how principles of possessive individualism fit with communal interests based on cooperation and mutual support, how parliamentary systems resting on ideas of representative democracy fit with systems based much more on direct democracy and face-to-face encounters, and how majoritarian processes can be reconciled with consensual interests; individual property rights with communal, punitive justice with restorative. These issues require more discussion and research but they are fundamental to the development of grounded and more inclusive concepts of legitimacy.

### **Identities and Citizenship**

The Solomon Islands is definitely a ‘state in formation’ rather than a failed or fragile state. This process has three quite distinct dimensions. The first is identifying the diverse communities and cultural identities that exist within the country. (In fact in the Solomons, there are many communities that need to be grafted together into a single nation). The second is establishing a compact with each community to come and live together in a single state and the third is establishing acceptable rules of that state. Each one of these dynamics is contentious since how they are resolved will determine the distribution of power, influence and patterns of resource allocation. What we have discovered though, is that unless these tasks are based on a rigorous appreciation of cultural difference and different types of traditional and customary practices, new constitutional arrangements are likely to fail.

# 1. Introduction

Over the last eight years the concept of fragile and failing states has increasingly been used as a justification for “humanitarian and development intervention” by a range of OECD actors. There is no doubt that many state systems are stressed and incapable of delivering services, law and order or basic protection for citizens. Whether or not these are sufficient reasons to justify external intervention (with or without the consent of states in question) is debatable. The challenge, therefore, is to understand the primary source of community strength, resilience and security in societies that exist within relatively weak states and in the process to try and determine what constitutes “grounded legitimacy”<sup>2</sup> for such state systems. Once this is understood it should be possible to develop partnerships with community as well as state actors that have a reasonable chance of enhancing processes that “work” and diminishing processes that are increasingly dysfunctional.

Stressed states face problems in a wide range of domains (e.g. provision of physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and the delivery of social services). All of this means that there is a need to think much more creatively (than has been the case to date) about how to mix a variety of actors, instruments, incentives and interventions (OECD DAC 2006:7) in order to ensure that state systems in stressed environments can fulfill basic functions with maximal amounts of community support and acceptance.

Ever since the tensions of 1998-2003, Solomon Islands has been identified by the international community as a “fragile state”. It has certainly faced big challenges in relation to the state’s capacity to provide physical security, develop legitimate political institutions, generate sound and uncorrupt economic management and deliver physical services. Yet despite these many challenges Solomon Islanders have managed to survive and life for them has continued as it has for centuries. This paper, therefore, is an effort to explore what it is that enables “strong but stressed” communities to survive in the face of “state weakness” and adverse internal or external environments.

This analysis is also aimed at questioning some taken for granted assumptions about state-society-community relationships by focusing on what it is that delivers “real” order in strained environments and how these local sources of strength and resilience might be built upon in rethinking and reformulating state building in post-colonial environments.

In particular it wishes to explore whether Custom, (seen in terms of traditional and widely accepted ways of behaving or doing something specific to a particular society, place or time) can help us understand some of the deeper continuities in Solomons political dynamics and whether and how these might be harnessed to develop political institutions that connect more organically to different Solomons cultural systems than the post colonial system currently in place.

Culture and custom provide a strong framework guiding the lives of most Solomon Islanders. Many participants indicated that custom is very important to their identity and their actions (AA, BK). Some pointed out that the laws of custom and religion have the same aims, so they are mutually reinforcing (AA). In other words many informants felt that there was a strong coherence between deep “customary” values and introduced religious values. According to several informants, custom promotes industriousness as well as respect for women and authority. When custom is weakened, it was suggested that problems such as laziness, dependence on others (including the government) and

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<sup>2</sup> This is a term developed by Kevin Clements to describe the utility and acceptability of the state to its citizens. It differs from other concepts of legitimacy in that grounded legitimacy rests on the extent to which states institutions in post colonial environments are able to justify their claims to rule on a basis of deep cultural values and traditions unique to those communities. It is in other words an invitation to think about the ways in which “traditional legitimacy” from a pre-colonial past can be embodied in “rational legal legitimacy” in the post-colonial present.



lack of respect emerge (AA, DL). People need to work to make the community strong and the nation good and cannot just wait for the government, who constantly make plans but often do not deliver.

One chief, alarmed at how the nation seemed to be moving away from its cultural roots, indicated that cultural inheritance was integral to contemporary life, ‘We can’t become white men – we are what we are.’ Elders also need to be involved with youth so that customs are passed down. This renewed interest in custom and tradition has to be taken very seriously by anyone interested in partnering with Solomon Islanders in the next phase of their economic, social and political development. The conceptual, ethical and practical challenge for Solomon Islanders is to identify and generate some agreement about whether there are cultural and customary traditions common to the diverse tribal groupings in the Solomons and then to work out the social and political significance of these customs for both social order and political development.

It is relatively easy for example, for those whose power base is primarily custom and tradition to invoke values and norms in the name of tradition with quite reactionary and negative consequences for women and young people and those who are excluded from traditional hierarchies. When this happens it is particularly difficult for outsiders to raise questions about the self serving use of tradition by elites interested primarily in preserving their own status and power, which may be one reason why many bilateral and multilateral aid donors have chosen to work with governing elites rather than traditional chiefs.

What is interesting is that increasingly customary chiefs, village elders and others in the Solomons and other parts of Melanesia are asking how they can utilise their traditional legitimacy to facilitate creative change and play a “positive” role in development processes. This desire provides a very important opportunity for OECD development ministries (in collaboration with local partners) to discern areas of complementarity between traditional and “modern” institutions and activities.

This focus on the power of custom and customary power raises some important questions about the concept of “sovereignty”. Can a custom system based on lineage connections to land, for example, ever be compatible with a political system in which the state or sovereign power lays claim to all land on behalf of the state and then delegates proprietorial and use rights over that land according to specified constitutional rules? Can a custom system based on ascriptive principles ever be compatible with a system based on sovereign equality, human rights and achievement principles? Can a customary system play economically and politically progressive development roles? And further, how is citizenship conceptualized in such a system? How can political actors in the Solomons blend the strengths of custom with those of the introduced political system? These are some of the questions that will be explored within this report.

## **2. Methodology**

This study of the Solomon Islands was conducted over several trips to Solomon Islands in 2007. On the first trip in August, Professor Kevin Clements and Dr Wendy Foley (who has lived in Solomon Islands, including Malaita and Honiara, for many years and is fluent in Solomon Pijin) worked together with a local research assistant, Mrs Jean Tafoa for 5 days in Honiara. After that, Dr Foley and Mrs Tafoa spent a further week in Malaita, visiting Malu’u sub-station and the capital of Auki as well as nearby villages, then another week in Honiara.

During another trip for different projects from late September to mid-October 2007, Dr Foley collected further information around the Marovo Lagoon in the Western Province and in Makira. Travelling by canoe to remote villages and participating in many workshops provided the opportunity to complement the data that had been collected in the earlier trip that had been restricted to locations close to roads.

We consulted with a wide variety of people from villages, education, health, business, churches, NGOs, government organizations, chiefs and elders, overseas missions and aid organizations. We had hoped to speak with more Members of Parliament, but due to the Parliament sitting for the entire time of the August visit, and the intense lobbying that was ongoing at the time, this was not possible.

We did, however, talk on numerous occasions to opposition politicians ensconced at the Honiara Hotel as they were planning non confidence motions against the Sogovare government. A list of individuals and groups consulted is found in Annex 2 (page 23). Issues discussed with these people are presented in this report and are supported with references from the literature and from contemporary newspaper articles.

Our methodology was ethnographic, qualitative and comparative. We made a paired comparison between the capacity, effectiveness and legitimacy of traditional and introduced systems of governance in relation to the delivery of social order, justice, health and education, paying special attention to issues such as the standing responsiveness and accountability of specific actors in each sphere.

### **3. Regional and Global Dynamics**

It is important to acknowledge that no state/nation exists in isolation. The Solomon Islands for example, exists, within Melanesia and within a geopolitical space that is dominated to a very large extent by Australia, New Zealand, East and South East Asia. This wider region exists within a world which has become deeply globalised over the past twenty years. It is assumed by most economic and political commentators that globalisation is positive. It is a central argument of this case study, however, that globalisation does not necessarily or automatically result in benefits to developing countries seeking to create the conditions within which sustainable economic development can occur: citizens needs can be satisfied and flexible and responsive political systems developed.

On the contrary there is a lot of growing evidence that globalisation is generating exactly the opposite consequences. This has important implications for the ways in which the more dominant powers in the region (Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, China, Taiwan etc) deal with micro states such as Solomon Islands.

What is now known as “negative globalisation” can undermine the positive outcomes that flow from trying to develop capable, effective and legitimate state mechanisms. It does so by undermining the capacity of state or private sector institutions to resist external pressures. In the Pacific, while there is not a “rush” on the part of international capital to develop labour intensive industries, there is pressure to break down trade and other barriers in the international market and to secure access to whatever tradeable commodities exist. Most small to medium sized nation states are unable to resist these influences and micro states face an almost impossible task trying to do so. Negative globalisation is generating a relatively borderless global economy and the multinational corporate institutions that dominate this economy are beginning to pose fundamental challenges to the traditional notion of the nation state. In fact it is possible that negative globalisation will challenge the 19<sup>th</sup> century idea of the nation state in the same way that industrialisation undermined feudalism.

In the first place, a global market place that can transcend traditional state boundaries is generating growing economic, political and social inequality between the haves and the have nots. This is fuelling a growing sense of personal and political grievance as more and more people feel excluded from the benefits of globalisation. These growing grievances are connected to an expansion of global lawlessness and armed violence. This means that there are constant challenges to the

development and maintenance of international, legal and political regimes and an unfortunate tendency to resort to the threat and use of force to maintain order.

In circumstances where state systems did not take firm root in the first place, where domestic, legal and judicial systems are weak and ineffective, and where political leadership engages in corrupt and illegal activity, external actors can generate powerful negative dynamics which undermine the well intentioned behaviour of even the most principled internal political and economic actors. Most of the states in Melanesia, for example, have been affected by external actors (both political and commercial) who have used their power and resources to advance their own interests. This external interference is sometimes blatant and sometimes subtle but external actors are normally able to generate pressures which internal decision makers cannot resist.

It is not in the interests of commercial or industrial interests for example to strengthen the regulatory capacity of either the traditional or modern sectors, but especially not the traditional as this is the one sector that highlights the collectivity over the individual and cooperation over competition. Thus we wish to argue it is vital that donors and national policy makers rethink orthodox notions of state building in order to generate systems that are capable of blending traditional and modern strengths in order to provide more choices for national leaders as they try to counteract negative external dynamics.

## **4. Political Economy, Cash Economy, Resource Management**

### **Overview**

Solomon Islands' economy is based on primary commodities from agriculture, forestry, mining and fishing. It has been recovering since the civil conflict, however it remains the poorest economy in the region and is heavily dependent on logging and aid (International Monetary Fund 2007). While economic growth is currently robust and inflation began to ease in 2006, the per capita income is still at two-thirds of its pre-conflict level. The government sector occupies 70-80 percent of the economy and 90 percent of service delivery such as medical services which are resourced by aid donors (pers. comm. Governor Central Bank 7 August, 2007). The private sector is relatively small and its contribution to the tax base is therefore also relatively small. The Government revenue continues to be lost through limited capacity to collect taxes on logging exports and fishing<sup>3</sup> (Aqorau 2007, Wairiu 2007), though financial management and investment has increased with the assistance of RAMSI. Moreover, the income tax collection is limited by the low employment rate. The RAMSI 2007 People's Survey of over 5,000 people indicated that only 20 percent paid tax from their wages (ANU Enterprise 2007). Some informants complained that money that goes to the government does not find its way out to the rural areas. In 2007 there was great frustration with the bottom up policy and severe doubts about whether it benefited rural people.

Food consumes more than half of average household incomes (Solomon Islands Statistics Development Project and Government of the Solomon Islands 2006). Generally low wages have not kept up with the cost of living<sup>4</sup>, sparking concern about the need to increase the minimum wage of SB\$1.50 (AU\$0.23) to SB\$7.20 (AU\$1.12)<sup>5</sup> per hour<sup>6,7</sup>. Inequalities, however, are widening in the Solomon Islands with low wages in sharp contrast to some executive salaries, such as the SB\$1.3m a year salary offered to Solomon Airline's new financial controller<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Gov't loses \$1m a week on log exports: Schaefer. *Solomon Star*. 25 October 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>4</sup> The painful reality life in SI. *Solomon Star*. 10 September 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>5</sup> Calculated for 1 November 2007 on <http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic>

<sup>6</sup> Gov't push for \$7.20 per hour pay rate. *Solomon Star*. 24 October 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>7</sup> Minimum wage is an urgent issue. *Solomon Star*. 25 October 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>8</sup> Iroga, R. L. Airline directors face the axe. *Solomon Star*. 26 October 2007. ed. Honiara.

Many Solomon Islanders work in isolation from financial services and as a result have limited financial literacy. The RAMSI 2007 People's Survey indicated that only 23 percent had a bank account while only 14 percent belonged to a superannuation scheme (ANU Enterprise 2007). The ANZ bank is beginning to install banking technology such as internet banking facilities and solar teller machines in some rural centres, but most people still do not have access to this<sup>9</sup>.

Additionally, there is very limited access to credit for rural people. This is a hindrance to running small rural businesses. Community credit unions fill part of the financial services void in provincial areas. One began in Auki in 2003 and now has 3000 members. A revolving fund for women to gain access to micro-credit in one area of Malaita was established by their Member of Parliament from the RCDF and later supplemented by funds from the New Zealand High Commission.

Similarly, the Small and Medium Enterprises Council of the Solomon Islands has a vision to register small businesses so that they can more easily provide access to training, credit and networking. They have not yet spread to every province, but are planning to do so in order to provide better opportunities in the provinces to attract people to return to home provinces and thus reduce some of the social problems in Honiara. They would also like to assist women to increase their participation in small business.

The cash economy has had great influence. While some informants were working in many voluntary roles in their community, some indicated that there was a move away from this and that people did expect money if they helped out – even in their own rural communities. Money in the Solomons, as is the case in neighbouring Papua New Guinea, is driving the loss of social capital (AA, AB, TW, MM).

Despite the weakness of the Solomon Islands national economy, informants reiterated that they believed that the country is well-resourced. Many people commented that in their home villages they did not need to depend on money because the environment satisfied most of their needs, including water, building materials, food, medicines and craft materials, in contrast to the towns where 'everything depended on money'. Some asserted that Solomon Islands is not a poor country. Malaita was described by its Premier as 'God's bank' when he voiced his opinion that Malaita has enough resources for its people. The implication is that these resources need to be well managed and shared so that all can benefit from them. The many isolated villages which do not have regular road or shipping transport, however, suffer from the inability to reliably send their products to the market. This makes subsistence in the contemporary Solomon Islands more difficult as it is difficult to earn extra cash for school fees and other needs.

Informants observed that often aid projects don't strengthen what is already there, but instead represent the latest priorities of donors in Tokyo, Brussels, Wellington or Canberra.

According to some informants, there is a tendency now for people to over-harvest without considering local conservation, while in the past old people taught principles of conservation that come from custom. Logging is having a particularly deleterious effect on customary land and is having a negative impact on the water quality of rivers and lagoons where it is being conducted. Commercial overharvesting of fish is also having a negative impact on access to local fish for food in some areas of the country. At a time when everyone in the community struggles to get enough money to pay for basic needs, it is especially upsetting when some individuals are enriched by the resource extraction while others are impoverished.

There is also over-exploitation of the marine environment, through cheating on tuna catches and the live dolphin export trade. It is logging, however, that is an abject lesson in world's worst practice. Independent experts estimate there is only a further five to seven years of commercial logging possible at the present rate of felling. Australian officials with the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) warned us that the Solomon Government is losing hundreds of thousands of dollars a week in revenue - money that could be used to build health clinics to reduce

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<sup>9</sup> Mamu, M. ANZ takes internet banking to villagers. *Solomon Star*. 7 September 2007. ed. Honiara.

infant and maternal mortality, for schools or on roads to allow agricultural products such as coffee to reach markets. Improved living standards would reduce the temptation for local communities to sign often divisive logging deals.

## **Assessment**

In relation to these issues, it is clear that the growth of the cash economy is placing severe stress on the subsistence economy. Development logic suggests that customary economic exchanges will inevitably give way to the capitalist market. While this may be so, it is nevertheless still important to ensure that the subsistence economy is as strong as it can be because this is the sector that provides the most basic safety net for individuals and villages. In relation to the cash economy and overseas development assistance, there is a certain perplexity about which sphere (the private sector, the village, the state or civil society) is capable and has the will to ensure that economic decisions will benefit the whole population as opposed to specific interests. These areas are ones in which one can see many arguments in favour of pursuing a process of complementarity- i.e. incorporating the interests of the state, civil society and customary spheres in village, provincial and national level discussions about the ways in which different economic policies are likely to benefit or disadvantage different groups through time.

In terms of resource management, the question is who has the power, the inclination and the will to constrain loggers and or ensure that revenue flows from logging go into the state exchequer as revenue for public services? In this area the evidence suggests that customary rhetoric and village preference is in favour of conservation but business practice and both customary leaders and political elites are willing to trade long term sustainability for short term gain. If individual villagers, for example, wish to object to this wanton destruction of tropical forests to whom do they go? Customary chiefs or government ministers?

A participant in a Marovo workshop described their local customary governance as top down. This means that many community people do not have the rights to speak up against their customary leadership if they disagree with “land owners” decisions on resource management. People in Marovo indicated that they wished to know how they could manage the resources so that they can both sustain them while deriving income from them. They also wanted the government to be more responsible in managing resources. People wished for more communication with the government. This suggests that in this instance there is recognition on the part of those living within customary frameworks that the state is the one actor that has the power to resist unrestrained logging. It has the legitimacy to act for sustainable development - whether it has the will or capacity is another question. Is this an area where customary leaders could adopt a much more pro-active stance in stiffening the resolve of the national authorities?

In the critical areas of political economy, resource management and market regulation, it is not clear, to the people of the Solomons which sphere is best capable of defending their interests. On the one hand they want to believe that the customary sphere will protect forests and lagoons, but they have had experience of customary leaders selling out to overseas interests. Similarly in relation to the state, concessions are given but benefits do not return to the people. Other civil society actors, NGO's, churches and others are also incapable of providing effective resistance to interests which challenge the integrity of the customary sphere.

Lurking behind more widely based discussions of economic management, however, lies the deeper question of how to deal with corruption. There may be sufficient resources, for example, to satisfy basic needs but if they are allocated corruptly, inappropriately or in ways that do not serve the “public good” or are directed to external actors, they will not deepen or strengthen the legitimacy of either traditional or introduced governance systems.

## 5. Peace, Order, Security, Political Stability

### Overview

For the most part, Solomon Islands is peaceful and safe for its citizens, though there are some law and order problems in the country and Honiara is beginning to experience growing crime rates as its population expands. Most people, however, reported that village life is better than town life because it is safe. Safety in the villages is provided by the proximity of large extended family networks and also by customary leaders. Money problems and isolation from protective or restraining kin networks were blamed for increasing trouble in towns. This suggests strongly that basic social order, the settlement of personal grievances and the maintenance of social harmony is rooted much more in the customary realm than in the “rational-legal” realm.

RAMSI, which began work in Solomon Islands in mid-2003 contributes positively to peace and order in the country and is generally widely appreciated. The Law and Justice Program provide personnel and administrative support, as well as assisting with infrastructure and procurement for justice agencies and the courts (High Court and Magistrate’s Court). No military forces are maintained by the Solomon Islands, although a police force of nearly 500 includes a border protection unit. The police also are responsible for fire services, disaster relief, and maritime surveillance. The police force is headed by a Commissioner, appointed by the Governor-General and responsible to the Prime Minister. The capacity of the state, therefore, to exercise a monopoly of force is severely restricted which is why most citizens of the country are very relieved to have an external police and military presence to stand behind the government and capable of maintaining order.

Customary order plays a critical role in the maintenance of social order, however, it is not always easy to see how the state and government contribute to peace, order and stability. The lack of a strong party system generates considerable political instability as individual Members of Parliament shift their allegiance for personal gain. On the other hand a strong party system could prove quite destructive and divisive in a high context culture which places strong stress on communal solidarity. It raises some questions about the wisdom of adversarial political system for the Solomons.

Where cultures based on strong and resilient communities are functioning well they are largely self regulating. People conform because of the intrinsic benefits of community belonging and a strong concern for public repute. In that regard, the role of the police force within most Solomon communities has been somewhat ambivalent and most police have been directed to urban areas where kin and religious ties are weakest. In recent years there has been a renewed focus on how to strengthen community policing in remote areas.

As most villages do not have a police, or indeed, any other government presence, customary leaders (including elders and chiefs) are the ones primarily responsible for keeping the Solomon Island communities orderly and peaceful. It is the chiefs or religious leaders who are usually called on to deal with community disturbances such as disorderly behaviour or domestic violence.

Customary leaders, for example, organised reconciliation ceremonies to ensure the reintegration of former militants. While these have, by and large been successful, there is sometimes confusion over what is the most appropriate system for making amends after the tension. Militants who have paid traditional compensation in customary reconciliation ceremonies are now asking why they also have to serve prison terms. They feel as though they are subject to double jeopardy and double punishments which they consider quite unjust. This is another good reason for developing clear jurisdictional divisions between customary and introduced law.

While many rural settings are peaceful and orderly, there has been an increase in criminal activity in both rural and urban areas, particularly involving drugs and alcohol and chiefs are often not well equipped to deal with this.

From this preliminary look at customary governance it is clear that social order, and the delicate reciprocal exchanges that lie at the heart of Melanesian “harmony” depend on a detailed knowledge and internalisation of custom; custodians of that custom (Chiefs, “big men” or “centre-men”) and

individuals who respect that custom and believe that harmony is more likely to flow from compliance with it rather than resistance to it. Custom in the Solomon's is a major source of what Weber called "Traditional" legitimacy and it is on this that most people seem to rely for their individual and collective well being. At the very minimum, therefore, it is essential that this customary order is not undermined by development effort or more optimally that development initiatives acknowledge, build on and flow organically from the strengths that lie within custom.

Combining custom and religion is a very potent source of normative and integrative pressure. Churches were central in keeping communities together during the tension and in facilitating community based reconciliation ceremonies afterwards. They have worked in collaboration with customary leaders on these issues.

Transparency International has demonstrated considerable courage in focusing attention on political corruption, central government inefficiencies and the costs/benefits of decentralised administration. It has not been able, however, to play a very pro-active role in relation to post conflict reconstruction, or reconciliation processes because government has decided that such matters are the preserve of the state and not civil society. The overall result is that many of the sources of the 2003 conflict remain unaddressed and there has been inadequate attention paid in the way in which the formerly warring parties can move beyond symbolic to more grounded reconciliation.

This lack of access to the government has generated high levels of demoralisation and a deep anxiety about how civil society groups can get issues on the political table and have them dealt with in an appreciative context.

In response to this inability to get issues attended to, the Church of Melanesia, for example, decided it was important to refocus attention on the needs and interests of communities, utilising culturally appropriate ways of doing this. They are doing this by recognising the strength of custom; focusing on the strengths of communities and paying specific attention to community level leadership (both male and female) and creating conditions within which this leadership might begin harnessing communal land owners to identify appropriate income generating projects, start resolving transport and communication difficulties themselves and generate more sustainable and largely self governing communities.

## **Assessment**

We can see from this brief overview that customary systems, government mechanisms and civil societies all play important and complementary roles in relation to securing peace and order in the Solomon Islands. In the absence of effective, capable or well regarded political institutions, social order, peace and political stability is generated by customary groups and civil society organizations, especially the churches. Apart from the overarching security provided by RAMSI, social order in the Solomons is largely derived from the customary and civil society realms. Considerable public legitimacy is given to respected religious and customary leaders, it is they who are responsible for generating effective social order, maintaining high levels of cooperation and unity in villages and it is the institutions that sustain this leadership that most people rely on to ensure harmony at the village and provincial level.

## **6. Social Needs and Service Delivery**

### **Overview**

Despite many negative perceptions of the government and its incapacity to extend sovereign reach to all parts of the Solomons, it does provide services such as education and health to Solomon Islanders even though these are stretched by limited budgets (due to the low taxation base), the spread of the population around many scattered islands and villages and by government ineffectiveness.

The motto of the Solomon Islands government is ‘To lead is to serve’ and it was pointed out during fieldwork that this reflects a strongly held cultural value – that Solomon Islanders live for other people. This notion embodies traditional norms of reciprocity and forms the basis for what social welfare exists in the Solomons – welfare provided mostly by kin. While this motto forms the basis of a code of ethics for politicians, it also proves to be a problem in the government system where the sharing of “public largesse” by Parliamentarians and government workers is expected by many people. There is, therefore, a need to work towards a clearer division of responsibility between customary and governmental delivery of services. This is one area where there may be some incompatibility between customary and governmental values.

Civil society complements much of the service delivery of the government. A particular strength of churches is their national networks, which link even the remotest of villages. There is some coordination and sharing of information by churches at the program level but SICA is overwhelmed by cascading needs from churches and villages all around the country. AusAID’s Community Strengthening Programme (CSP) has tried to form links with SICA but have found lack of capacity to be a barrier (VS). The Church of Melanesia (CoM) has various programs designed to meet the social needs of people and communities. A range of NGOs, including local and international, also provide a variety of services from literacy training to environmental advocacy and protection.

Though there is considerable NGO and government cooperation, synergies between some government ministries and NGOs are not being built on. There is a need to look for opportunities to build on strengths and streamline services further so that maximum results can come from more collaborative approaches. In most communities, villagers also work hard to provide essential services. This is a particular strength of the Solomon Islands society, ensuring social security in a nation where there is no other welfare system.

Schools are run by a plethora of authorities including the Honiara Town Council, the national Ministry of Education, provincial governments, churches, myriad community high schools run by local school boards (with the central government paying teacher salaries) and other privately run schools. A particular issue that confronts diverse providers in education is the need for coordination between state and non-state players. The education authorities that exist also have weaknesses and limitations to their capacity. There are not enough schools in the Solomon Islands for every child to receive education for ten years. Basic education is not provided free and many families reported difficulty in affording school fees, resulting in many children receiving inadequate education<sup>10</sup>. While getting education is a problem in many villages due to either lack of facilities or poor quality of the services available, some students can go right through to form 6 in their village, but then not be able to attain a job in either the village or town. Another criticism was that schools and training centres do not provide the skills needed in the Solomon Islands. The expense of education and the poverty of the people are resulting in the development of a number of “Volunteer Schools” where trained and untrained volunteer teachers provide basic education to children. (See longer report for details).

The revised National Health Strategy 2006-10 provides a structure for communication with partners in health service delivery, including churches and NGOs. All partners suffer, however, from a lack of capacity, which underscores the need to work together. The government supports about 90 percent of the church health services. Women’s groups also support Ministry of Health projects through their assistance with bed mosquito net distribution and dipping and also TB education. The Mothers’ Union of the Church of Melanesia assists in health programs by providing materials for hospitals. Other NGO groups also have complementary programs.

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<sup>10</sup> Gov’t Seeks to Reduce School Fees *Solomon Times*. 7 October 2007. ed. Honiara.



One of the greatest social needs in the Solomon Islands is for appropriate development that can encourage people to remain in rural areas, while giving them access to appropriate education, incomes and facilities for a reasonable standard of living, one which will enable payment for needs such as health, education and recreation.

The Community Strengthening Programme of AusAID (CSP) is one of many programs working towards development. This programme is aimed at strengthening community capacity through the Community Peace and Restoration Fund and it does this through small grants that go direct to communities. This programme is aimed at getting villagers to determine their own needs, wants and also identify their own human and capital resources for satisfying these. It aims to build on existing strengths and collaborates closely with institutions (like the churches) that are already networked and can take advantage of new models, processes for the delivery of development assistance. The programme is innovative but challenging for both AusAID and the Solomons government in that it seeks to promote development through village level community mechanisms rather than through state funded and directed programmes. It is also aimed at incorporating the interests of young and old women and men in decision making processes which, to some extent challenges customary hierarchies and top down decision making processes. We discovered in many conversations that when the government or churches were not able to provide basic social services, communities and villagers often stepped in to provide these themselves.

### **Assessment**

Although much more work remains to be done on service delivery in the Solomons, it can be seen from this brief discussion that there are serious gaps and deficiencies in the government's capacity to gather the necessary resources and allocate them in ways that will boost the delivery of basic education, health and welfare in the Solomon context. The churches and some civil society groups are doing what they can (with or without the support of government and external donors) to fill gaps and provide basic medical and educational services to peripheral regions and within Honiara itself.

In the final analysis, however, most people continue to rely on kin, village and province for the provision of basic welfare provisions in times of need and for many educational and health services as well. The prevalence of individuals such as those who are delivering basic services as volunteers, is testimony to the Solomons "ethic of care" and a consequence of serious gaps in the state's ability to deliver these services. It is difficult to argue that one sector rather than another should be responsible for these services but a case can be made for some fundamental rethinking of the ways in which such services are delivered and by whom. It might be that this is another instance where the state should provide a central coordinating and revenue providing role, but civil society and village actors should provide the services. Again, this is only going to work if there is much closer attention paid to the needs of locality and if Members of Parliament and government decision makers are willing to delegate, what some might assume to be, core state functions to the informal sector with the formal sector providing some degree of coordination, quality assurance and control and a national framework within which these services can be delivered. There is clearly scope in relation to the delivery of health, education and even development services for higher levels of coordinated complementarity. But there are also many instances which we identified where religious institutions and villagers could easily substitute for the state in relation to the delivery of such programmes. There were not that many examples of incompatibility in relation to customary and governmental service providers. Basically most Solomon Islanders are happy to receive services from whatever source is most efficient.

## **7. Law and Justice, Customary Law, Rule of Law, Regulatory Environment**

### **Overview**

Structural stability, or what Kenneth Boulding calls "Stable Peace", (Boulding 1978) depends on clear and widely accepted legal and political frameworks within which individuals and collectivities (kin groups, clans, gender groups, and large scale ethnic groups) feel included and acknowledged.

Most importantly they must also feel (subjectively and objectively) that their basic human needs are being satisfied and that they are receiving fair and equal treatment from peers and superiors. In other words justice is not an optional extra for long term sustainable peace. It is an integral part of it. There can be no lasting peace without justice.

There are three very different concepts of justice all of which are in play in the Solomons at the present time.

(i) **Legal Justice**, for example, is fair and equal treatment under a rule of law as opposed to systems where justice is arbitrary and determined by the rich and powerful. “Legal” justice refers to all written formal law which is imposed by the state. It rests heavily on concepts of universality, citizenship and of sovereign equality under the law. It draws heavily on liberal principles and concepts of individual rights and freedoms. “Legal” justice means that all citizens irrespective of rank or status are equally accountable under the law for their behaviour.

(ii) **“Customary” Justice** rests heavily on what is known as customary law which is a body of largely unwritten rules and principles which applies to particular communities for the settlement of disputes, grievances and complaints. As Jennifer Corrin Care describes it:

“Customary law ... is indigenous, binding only on those who accept it as the law applicable to them. It is fragmentary, in that it may differ from island to island and even village to village. Customary law is basically conservative and patriarchal. It emphasizes status, duties and community values.”<sup>11</sup>

(iii) **Social Justice** as described by Alex Schmid is:

“A situation characterized by rule of law (procedural justice) and fair distribution of resources and opportunities in society (substantive justice)... Principles of distributive justice that reduce inequality in resources vary between cultures and societies as the principles of what are considered fair and the realities of power vary enormously”.<sup>12</sup>

A number of informants (AP, GR) argued that the quest for peace and justice in the Solomons will only be considered legitimate and successful if the state and judicial systems become hybrid combinations of indigenous and introduced law and if they take seriously the importance of custom and tradition in the formation and execution of state power. There are, of course many challenges with this system as well. The first is that of potential for nepotism and particularism and the importance of having impartial chiefs settling local disputes. The second is that of ensuring some codification of customary decisions and consistency between or even within different customary jurisdictions.

One of the challenges of developing a hybrid justice system is to develop an appropriate division of labour between customary and introduced law and some protocols and laws about when to trigger one or other system.

There was a consensus among knowledgeable informants that the local delivery of justice, through the government’s local court system, was not working well (SA, AP, FK, TK). The police and court systems are considered more acceptable to urban dwellers than rural, to those who are living in relatively atomized or individualized settings rather than those who are living within villages. Customary law is likely to be used much more by people in village settings than by people living in urban environments.

The Constitution of the Solomon Islands Schedule Section 3 Part 3 states that customary law “shall have effect as part of the law of the Solomon Islands”. A complex legal pluralism resulting from the mix of indigenous law that survived colonisation, adopted foreign laws from numerous sources and

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<sup>11</sup> Jennifer Corrin Care, “Reconciling Customary Law and Human Rights in Melanesia” *Hibernian Law Journal* 2003 p 54

<sup>12</sup> Alex P Schmid, 2000 *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms*, Leiden Erasmus University. Pp52-53

post-independence law made by the Solomon Islands Parliament and courts leaves the relationship between different categories of law unclear (Corrin Care 2001).

Chiefs are losing power and respect and they are seeking greater empowerment, for example through the enforcement of their decisions (AP; PK). However, local justice is variable, depending on the strength of traditional systems. Some areas of the country have systems that have deteriorated. Most people see chiefs as important to local justice. When there is disharmony, custom provides ways to re-establish relationships.

Apart from Transparency International in Solomon Islands, which has very direct interests in maintaining the integrity of the justice system (especially in relation to clean and uncorrupt government), few of the other civil society organizations or church groups that we spoke with were directly dealing with issues of law, justice and the connections between the customary and introduced legal sectors.

### **Assessment**

Solomon Islands is an excellent example of a hybrid legal system in formation. Customary law, despite colonialism and the post independence tensions has remained strong and vital. The Chief Justice, himself acknowledges the importance of customary law (especially in relation to land disputes) and is looking for ways to give a more formal structure to the informal sector. This worries some advocates of customary law because it could be construed as an effort to formally codify and legitimate the informal sphere. Some worry that such codification and formal accreditation of informal adjudicators might subvert the informal sphere but the Chief Justice seems committed to ensuring the integrity of both systems as long as there is clarity about the jurisdictional privileges of both. He argues, for example, that chiefs should be paid for doing legal work even if they are doing it according to customary principles (AP). He does see a need, however, for the informal sphere to become more accountable for their actions and decisions and for some explicit articulation between both spheres. This area of law and justice, however, is definitely one where there is much to be gained by allocating some clear jurisdictional rights to the informal sphere and vice versa in a spirit both of substitution and complementarity. There are also areas of deep incompatibility in relation to law and justice. Most islanders prefer to manage grievances by traditional rather than legal means. Most prefer to apply traditional punishments and remedies and there is deep ambivalence about retributive as opposed to restorative justice. This is perhaps epitomised by the anxiety that many people feel about the new Rove Prison which is seen primarily as a place of punishment rather than rehabilitation.

## **8. Political Leadership, Representation and Political Will**

### **Overview**

The Solomon's are extremely dependent on aid and overseas development assistance and this generates a constant sense of inadequacy and inferiority especially when aid donors seem inclined to support political institutions and mechanisms that are viewed very skeptically and cynically by Solomon Islanders. It is in these circumstances that Solomon Islanders think somewhat nostalgically about what existed prior to colonization and whether that old traditional/customary order might provide the basis for a different kind of political leadership, a different ethics of care and a new basis for thinking about how to develop a political system that is more organically linked to locality than the current one.

Throughout the Solomons, as is the case in Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and New Caledonia, there is considerable diversity in what is understood by customary leadership. This gives rise to conceptual and sometimes actual confusion about who is a traditional leader and why. This is because customary leadership can be achieved through a mix of inherited rights, personal abilities and achievements (White 2004). The authority of most Solomon customary leaders relates to their land owning descent groups, their knowledge of local custom and history, particular skills and long

connection with their communities (White 2004). Customary governance continues to hold lineages together, however, the place of customary leaders in the Solomon Island societies is still clearly very important, though there are many pressures now undermining this (FG, RR). Some customary chiefs balance different roles, such as Rick Hou, the Governor of the Solomon's Central (Reserve) Bank and Bishop Alfred Karibongi, Paramount Chief of Makira Ulawa Province and Bishop of the Church of Melanesia of Makira/Ulawa Province. Both of these men are able to combine roles from the traditional village sphere and the sphere of the state.

Tensions can and do arise between work and chiefly roles, especially when work is located away from the home village and island, however, customary norms are evolving to accommodate changing social circumstances, as they always have. Some chiefs have moved to Honiara and continue to work within their communities there (see Annex 1 for examples of this) or continue to work with their rural communities from a town base (Liligeto 2006). Some informants, however, indicated that they thought custom doesn't work as well in Honiara as it does in village areas (AW, JF). This is also a common complaint in Vanuatu as well and it does appear that customary rule is more difficult in the relative anonymity of the city where face-to-face community relationships are replaced by more formal individualised exchanges.

The majority of Solomon Islanders continue to look to customary leaders for guidance on many issues and prefer to resolve a dispute with a neighbour, for example, through a chief or customary law (ANU Enterprise 2007) than through going to a modern legal system or appealing to government authorities. Because of this preference, chiefs work hard at solving community problems and trying to guide development projects. They also have an important role in ensuring cultural education so traditional knowledge and skills are not forgotten. This preference for utilising traditional mechanisms for basic social problem solving suggests strongly, that this might be a case for substituting "rational-legal" problem solving with some variant of traditional mechanisms. This is, already being explored by the High Court, for example, in relation to delegating powers to deal with different types of land dispute to traditional authorities. This one example could be reproduced in a range of other issue areas as well.

A chief in North Malaita explained that his language group, To'abaita, is divided into three areas. Each area has two houses of chiefs, each with about six chiefs. Chiefs from each house have regular meetings, where they discuss diverse topics of community significance such as local development (e.g. the installation of a coconut oil press, solar and wind power, or the building and maintenance of schools and clinics), mapping community problems and how to deal with them, government, land issues as well as cultural loss and revival. Some respondents, however, indicated that there is not a lot of chiefly power practiced these days and that people are not getting enough protection from their chiefs because many chiefs are not living their roles and are, therefore, not providing the protection that their group expects. (PK).

Different Solomon governments have struggled for decades with the question of how to integrate traditional leadership into formal governance structures (Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 1996) without distorting or undermining the positive benefits of customary leadership (White 2004). The Sogavare government's Bottom Up Approach (BUA) which owed much to the work of John Roughan of the Solomon Island Development Trust, aimed at strengthening the roles and centrality of chiefs, but there was no national structure that would enable this to occur. This meant that he had to delegate much of this work to local initiatives and the power of local village leaders/chiefs.

The Constitutional Reform Unit in the Prime Minister's Department has been developing a range of new models that might engage customary chiefs more fully into legislative processes. One suggestion is that customary chiefs should be involved in the legislative process at the State/Parliament level (State Government Taskforce 2001), though it has also been suggested that the chiefs be given a consultative role rather than a political or legislative role (PK). This model is aimed at better using chiefs as critical resources for effective local governance while simultaneously bringing greater transparency and accountability to government (White 2004).

Currently, only a few Members of Parliament consult with chiefs in their constituency (AA). This consultation, however, is discretionary for government members and most do not avail themselves of the opportunities to take soundings with customary chiefs on matters of public policy. Some provinces have developed formal Councils of Chiefs (Cox and Morrison 2004). The Isabel Council of Chiefs, for example, received official recognition in 1984 when the province passed a resolution acknowledging its role in local governance, leading to cooperation between chiefs, churches and the provincial government in an arrangement termed the ‘Tripod’ (White 2007).

In a speech by the Prime Minister at Independence celebrations in 2007, Mr Sogavare acknowledged the importance of customary governance and alluded to the tensions around this governance and development projects:

Chiefs and community leadership have a duty of care to ensure that our people are conscious of the fact that they are part of the overall national decision making process on matters of development, social harmony and peaceful coexistence. For example, a tribal decision to stop a major national project affects the entire country, so are decisions that undermine the rights of others to enjoy respect (Sogavare 2007).

The chiefs’ work for their communities in a voluntary capacity and they frequently need to spend time with their people, travel to meetings at their own expense and are away from their homes (and gardens) for a lengthy period of time. This may be one area where some targeted financial assistance from the Solomon government to customary rulers could compensate them for the time taken to build and maintain social order.

It has even been suggested that legislation may be needed to register chiefs (AP). Many respondents suggested the need for empowerment of chiefs and community leaders to enable them to work effectively in a rapidly changing environment with all of the attendant pressures that come with social change and economic disadvantage.

Civil society organizations are important training grounds for different kinds of political leaders. Solomon’s political culture, however, is not that supportive of civil society organizations and there is deep ambivalence towards those that monitor and comment on government policies. This means that Civil Society organizations (Churches, NGOs) have had to provide leadership training in something of a political vacuum. The hope is that trained leaders will be able to hold chiefs, politicians, and the judiciary to high levels of accountability but this hope is normally implicit rather than explicit. The Church of Melanesia, for example, incorporates leadership training in its Inclusive Community Programme and has developed leadership training manuals and run workshops in various provinces for chiefs and others in the community. As far as we could make out, this project has been very successful in developing new religious leaders who lead by example in local communities rather than simply engaging in political advocacy that is not heard by elected leaders.

## **Assessment**

The importance of personal integrity and the reputation of leaders are important in “High Context” cultures like the Solomons. What kin, language and regional groups think about their leaders is vital to effective and respected leadership. It became very clear in all of our interviews and discussions that customary governance is very critical to the maintenance of social order in the Solomon Islands. In these customary orders, the roles of traditional leaders are acknowledged by both the government and people as being important to social well being<sup>13</sup>.

In particular it is important to identify who is served or not served by customary practices and, where custom is working to generate resilient social systems, how it might be strengthened to encourage a deeper solidity to social life than exists at the moment. “Modern” economic and political activity in the Solomons tends to subvert community resilience.

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<sup>13</sup> Huta, R. PM praises chiefly leadership. *Solomon Star*. 20 August 2007. ed. Honiara.

The continuing “living” significance of traditional authority and customary culture in the Solomons and other parts of Melanesia suggests either that modernisation theory was misplaced in its assumption that traditional communities would inevitably give way to atomised societies or that such theories did not pay enough attention to the ways in which custom provides a rallying point for those wishing to resist efforts to incorporate entire systems into the modern world economy. In any event, the fact that most of our respondents were generally so positive about custom and tradition suggests that more development initiatives should be dedicated to ensuring that custom plays a more central role within “futures” thinking for the Solomons.

This discussion of political leadership in both the formal and informal spheres suggests that there are indeed ways in which leaders in both the customary and state sectors can play complementary roles in the task of state building.

We want to explore ways in which both spheres might be harnessed to develop more “organic” systems that are capable of maintaining “traditional identity” in a “globalized world” and also generating political and economic systems resilient enough to resist dynamics which ignore the significance of place, customary identity and locality while building a nation state and responding to the huge pressures of globalisation.

## **9. Participation and Inclusion in Decision-making, Voice and Accountability**

### **Overview**

While the provinces do have some capacity to collect taxes, these are both limited and limiting (Cox and Morrison 2004). It was suggested that provincial ministries could work more collaboratively with their national counterparts. There are many hopes held for the possible introduction of a federal system to replace the current system of government. Many provinces hope that this will give them more power (as states) to reach down to their people, but uncertainty about this was expressed by others. The concept of “political hybridity” is one way of capturing what a more “organic”, “evolutionary” “grounded” approach to state building might look like.

Another weakness in the current division of provincial and national political responsibilities is that donors often bypass the province (RI). While the donors are working in provinces, they do so through their links with national government or nationally based NGOs. This means that provincial authorities are often unaware of what projects are being proposed and their implications for the locality. Landowners, for example, often come to the provincial government if they have problems for which they need help, but at other times they deal directly with national government or companies, bypassing the province.

It is perceived by some that it would be more effective to make more use of localised governance, including chiefs, in addition to more effective provincial governance (JT). Informants recommended that governments need to take culture seriously and look at how governance can draw on the rich Solomon Islands cultures.

What we can conclude from this brief overview of modern forms of governance is that most people (especially those living outside of Honiara) have a very vague concept of what the government is or does, because its reach is limited, its representatives have little or no contact with citizens, the services provided are minimal and it is not considered either trustworthy or reliable. It is not considered capable, effective or legitimate. Because of this, most citizens prefer traditional mechanisms of governance to formal state institutions, with the result that the most formal government in the Solomons appears to be an abstract and somewhat epiphenomenal system in relation to their daily work and activities.

Links between the Solomons government and its people are generally quite weak (RR, AB). Many informants indicated that Members of Parliament rarely visited their constituency, appearing only during election campaigns, often with plenty of money or goods to distribute to those promising to vote for them. As one informant lamented, however, “As soon as Parliamentarians are elected, we

lose control of them” (FG, RR, AW, JG, JF). Often benefits promised by the Parliamentarians if re-elected are not delivered. While chiefs, pastors or elders help deal with local political issues, government politics usually come into play just at election time. Weak though the links may be between people and politics, there is some effort from people to influence politicians.

Bias towards constituents who voted for them was also a common concern people expressed. Many people feel that representation is biased. In the Western Province, Malaita, Makira, and Honiara, we heard repeatedly that politicians kept lists of people who voted for them (they have their ways to find out) and that people not included in the list are treated differently when they look to their political leader for impartial treatment. Low levels of accountability for government funds such as the Rural Constituency Development Fund<sup>14</sup> also contributes towards this issue. The rewards for supporting a political candidate could include such things as bags of rice and cooking pots during campaigns and generosity with the Rural Constituency Development Fund after the election.

Creating space for communities to become more engaged with governance is a challenge in the Solomon Islands. Input from people and organizations at the grass roots are rarely welcomed in the current government climate although there may be higher levels of responsiveness under the Sikua administration.

SICA officers expressed the belief that if the church and the government worked together, and by using the churches’ network, that things could be better. When SICA tried to do this, however, in August 2007 by suggesting a dialogue between the churches and the state on different kinds of development strategy, they were told in no uncertain terms by the Governor-General (at the instigation of the Prime Minister) that they had no right to interfere in the government’s business (PR).

Branches of government, such as the Women’s Development Division (WDD) provide a way for government services to extend to women in all provinces. On Malaita, however, the WDD is hampered in reaching women all around the province because of limited funding from the central government. To compensate for this, they have voluntary coordinators in regional five locations to help in their work of ensuring rural women receive information and gain confidence to make decisions in all areas of life.

Chiefs sometimes act as spokespeople for their people, either alone or as a group of chiefs<sup>15</sup>. Chiefs are expected to have good leadership skills and often apply these leadership qualities in contemporary and customary ways. If they are wise they will lead by incorporating many voices into decision making and into enhancing their political effectiveness.

A number of informants (e.g. FK) expressed a certain amount of nostalgia for colonial administrative arrangements. He felt that although colonialism was a negative influence overall it did result in delegated authority to “Headmen” and “Chiefs” in villages and District Officers made a point of connecting with these leaders on a regular basis to pre-empt and manage village and provincial level conflicts. It was a system that did encourage communication between villages and the centre and villager participation in the decision making of “headmen”. Unlike the modern state system which has political leaders “helicoptering in” for brief visits (if the constituency is lucky enough to be visited) the old colonial system had District Officers, walking from village to village, being informed about local needs by “headmen” and getting a very immediate sense of where trouble was brewing and what might be needed to deal with it. This generated a much more direct connection between the centre and the periphery than exists under the current programme.

The Grand Coalition for Change (GCC) government is often accused of not listening to the people. According to one local NGO worker, the government didn’t recognise NGOs. (TW) In Solomon

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<sup>14</sup> Inifiri, J. "Some MPs forced officers not to reveal use of funds". *Solomon Star*. 7 November 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>15</sup> Chief wants use of funds clarified. *Solomon Star*. 23 October 2007. ed. Honiara.

Islands, small indigenous NGOs feel that they suffer in the shadows of their better-resourced international counterparts.

## Assessment

There is no real appreciation on the part of most elected or non elected leaders of the contractual rights of citizens *vis-à-vis* the government or other institutions of state. Nor are their high levels of accountability for their actions. By and large Members of Parliament are remote from their constituencies; are not bound by any “party discipline” and do not tend to act on behalf of either provincial or national interests but largely in relation to their own interests. The civil society sphere (particularly the church sector) and customary leaders are given high symbolic standing and are used to legitimate the institutions of state (The Executive, the Legislature, Police and the Judiciary) but they are not accorded “standing” in the day to day affairs of the state and there is normally a strong desire to keep these realms separate in practice. The result is a political system of three quite distinct spheres (the State, Civil Society and Customary) that sometimes run in parallel, sometimes in competition and sometimes together. One of the central arguments of this paper is that there is a need to get much higher levels of articulation and agreement between these three realms if each is to realize its own particular strengths in relation to the maintenance of social order, the realization of national goals and harmonious and sustainable development.

Most of the informants we spoke to felt that they could participate in the informal spheres of custom, civil society and religious organizations with higher levels of inclusion and attention than was possible within the political and administrative spheres. While there is a greater sense of “affection” for customary rulers than politicians, customary elders and chiefs are not immune from criticism. Some people talked about problems occurring if chiefs sold resource rights without referring to the clan or the tribe. There is much talk in the Solomons about people not being consulted and receiving no benefits from the resource extraction taking place on their communal lands. Current cynical jokes such as “ Replace the C in ‘Chief’ with a T and what do you have?” reflect the experience and opinions of some Solomon Islanders with chiefs who do not facilitate consensual decision making and are not accountable to their people for their decisions.

The fact remains, however, that the informal customary sector is much larger than the formal. Those who pay taxes are in a distinct minority so there is little sense of having a financial stake in the formal political process and being able to demand more active representation of interests. The narrowness of the tax base in subsistence states like the Solomon Islands is a major barrier to successful Western-style governance. This raises questions, as Nixon posits, (Nixon 2006) about the fit of a Western-style government system in the absence of a strong economic base with which to support it.

The reality is that much of Solomons politics is already the result of a melding of customary and introduced ways. This hybridity is evident in everyday things such as housing, food and health care, but it is also evident in village and national governance; it permeates the whole of society. It is demonstrated in formal occasions, such as provincial Second Appointed Days, where representatives from National and Provincial governments, police, school groups, civil society in the form of women’s groups and church groups, as well as community and custom dance and music groups and chiefs all parade together providing a rich display of the different facets of their communal life, where introduced systems blend with local cultural ways. The assertion of the value of customary ways in the face of the massive assaults of modernisation and globalisation is what defines the culture of Solomon Islands as different from Western cultures.

Traditional institutions at the village and regional levels have managed to exert a strong and persistent influence over political order, basic security and development despite colonial rule and efforts to modernise state systems in the post-independence period. Leading political actors within the Solomons know that they have to give much more than lip service to traditional authority and in different ways they do this. There has, however, been an unwillingness to accord as much legitimacy to the traditional sector as there has been to the “introduced”. Thus, while considerable



“symbolic” attention is paid to the importance of custom and tradition, it is assumed that this sector will eventually give way to post colonial forms of government. It is our contention that this has not and will not happen in the Solomons because most people’s security is more likely to be secured by the village than it is by the state.

## 10. Citizenship, Wantokism, “Islandism”

Our limited research time meant that we could not explore some of the issues sketched above in more depth. But it became very clear in the course of the field work that the Solomon Islands are definitely a state in formation rather than a failed or fragile state. Tom Woods, (TW) who is the technical advisor in the Constitutional Reform Unit, in the Prime Minister’s Department, argues very persuasively [personal communication and presentation 9<sup>th</sup> August 2007] that a formation of a state and an appropriate Constitution has three quite distinct components.

The first is identifying the community within a country. (In fact in the Solomons, there are many communities that need to be grafted together into a single nation). The second is establishing a compact with that community to come and live together as a state and the third is establishing the rules of the state. Each one of these dynamics is contentious since how they are resolved will determine the distribution of power, influence and patterns of resource allocation.

He argues that these components were not adequately resolved at Solomons independence and that there is therefore a need to reconstruct the state and remake the Constitution. He suggests that the very many diverse communities of the Solomons “lost” their authority when the Independence Constitution came into effect and that English Jurisprudence fitted uneasily with customary knowledge in relation to “fixing land rights” and ownership. Both of these factors have resulted in a highly underdeveloped notion of citizenship and have certainly resulted in the parallel spheres noted above. Most Solomon Islanders remain identified with kin and locality and only secondarily the nation state. Many Malaitans, for example, say they feel discriminated against (RI) and this serves to strengthen Malaitan identity as opposed to Solomon Islands identity. The same applies to many other provincial and sub provincial identities.

The challenge facing the Solomons now is how to acknowledge the diverse communities in existence within its sovereign territory and what it is that unites them. The second is how to establish a new compact between these groups and the state and finally a constitution that establishes the rules of the state. All of these are highly charged and proposals for a federal system of government are efforts to grapple with the complexity of this challenge. Quite simply, the Solomons is in the business of working out how family, kin and provincial identities can be combined with coherent notions of national identity and citizenship and how to do this in ways that reinforce community strengths first and state strengths second.

If we take family, kin, *wantok* and community seriously then there are some fundamental value differences that have to be represented in the reworking of the Independence Constitution. How does a Western style Constitution, for example, based on principles of possessive individualism fit with communal interests that are based on cooperation and mutual support? How does a Parliamentary system that rests on the notion of representative democracy fit with a system that is based much more on direct democracy whereby individuals make their interests known to the collectivity in face-to-face encounters? How can those involved in Constitutional reform processes square majoritarian with consensual interests; individual property rights with communal, punitive justice with restorative. These are the issues that Tom Woods feels are on the table and on the basis of our research we feel these are at the heart of how to develop new political arrangements out of hybrid systems that combine rational legal and customary models of rule. The stakes are high but if we take the time to think creatively about how to connect strong and resilient communities to new forms of political institution that will replace the weak, disconnected and corrupt systems that exist in most of Melanesia at the moment this will create the basis for sustainable, just and peaceful development for these communities into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## ACRONYMS

ANZ	Australia and New Zealand Bank Ltd
CoM	Church of Melanesia
CSP	Community Strengthening Programme (AusAID)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SICA	Solomon Islands Christian Association
RAMSI	regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
TB	Tuberculosis
WDD	Women's Development Division (SI Government Division)

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## **ANNEX 1     Burnscreek community**

### **Urban Chiefs**

A search of the *Solomon Star*, the main newspaper in Solomon Islands, using the search terms ‘Chief’ and ‘Burnscreek’ produced ten articles, dating from February 2005 to April 2007. The community of Burnscreek, a squatter settlement known for many problems in Honiara, the capital, has drawn much media attention because of its social and economic problems and has been described as ‘a hot spot for criminal activities’<sup>16</sup>, yet it is also a community where community leadership, including from chiefs, is active. While the roles of chiefs in contemporary urban locations cannot be assumed from this small number of newspaper articles, they never-the-less reveal much about modern chiefly roles. The articles indicate a broad leadership role for chiefs in encouraging and ensuring community welfare of both the local and broader Solomon Islands community. They have important roles among their own people and also in liaising with other sources of authority.

### **Community welfare**

We find in February 24, 2005, that Chief Peter Usi of Burnscreek community ‘was concerned with the welfare of his people’ and visited a section of his community where some 60 families were facing food shortages after heavy rain washed away food gardens<sup>17</sup>. He had liaised with the media, together with the community Chairman, to call upon the government to look at the situation and expressed concern that the National Disaster Council had not yet responded to a letter already sent to them.

In May 2005, Chief Peter Usi hosted a gathering of more than 50 community members at his house for a Mediation and Peace and Reconciliation meeting organised by the National Peace Council, because so many in the community had been victims of the tension in previous years<sup>18</sup>.

Uncertainty about land tenure is a problem in Burnscreek and in January 2006, Chief Peter Usi made an appeal to the people who had been displaced from the land that they claimed to work with the government to find solutions to the land problems. Moreover he urged all Solomon Islanders to participate in reconciliation so that many peoples can live as one people<sup>19</sup>.

Some months after this, Chief Usi urged his and the wider community to assist families displaced by the Chinatown riots and spoke on behalf of his people as they presented food donations to the Red Cross for the displaced Chinese people<sup>20</sup>. Chief Usi also encouraged the youth of his community to work hard to raise money for victims of the tsunami in Western and Choiseul Provinces in 2007, and stated publicly that while their community may be seen as violent and dangerous, the youth there also have the capacity to contribute positively to the community<sup>21</sup>.

### **Law and order**

Chiefs also fulfil some law and order functions in the urban community in collaboration with other law and order agencies of the government. When the Burnscreek area was the alleged source of much serious criminal activity in late 2006, the chiefs of the area were reported to have assisted police to arrest about 50 men who were suspects<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Mamu, M. NPC visits Burnscreek Community. *Solomon Star*. 5 May 2005. ed. Honiara.

<sup>17</sup> Mamu, M. Flooding affects families. *Solomon Star*. 24 February 2005. ed. Honiara.

<sup>18</sup> Mamu, M. NPC visits Burnscreek Community. *Solomon Star*. 5 May 2005. ed. Honiara.

<sup>19</sup> Rikimae, J. A. Squatters want dispute solved. *Solomon Star*. 16 January 2006. ed. Honiara.

<sup>20</sup> Mamu, M. Burnscreek donates food to families. *Solomon Star*. 26 April 2006. ed. Honiara.

<sup>21</sup> Inifiri, J. Burnscreek youth group donates money. *Solomon Star*. 29 April 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>22</sup> Wate, A. Council to close betel-nut market. *Solomon Star*. 9 October 2006. ed. Honiara.

Chief Usi was reported to have thanked RAMSI for their work in restoring law and order in their country<sup>23</sup>, and was also reported in early 2007 to be assisting RAMSI project officers to develop a youth project in the community<sup>24</sup>.

## Politics

In October 2005, chiefs of Burnscreek were reported to have endorsed a candidate for the forthcoming national election, as had chiefs in other electorates<sup>25</sup>. This letter to the Editor queries whether community leaders should 'influence their people to vote for a particular leader'. In a follow-up article several days later, Chief Irobeni of Burnscreek indicated that the chiefs have signed a MOU with one of the candidates for their constituency that they would have a vital role, together with churches, to work with him if he becomes a Member of Parliament to look after the Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF), which has become controversial because of accusations that Parliamentarians do not distribute these discretionary funds wisely to develop their constituency as they are intended, but instead use them to their advantage. Chief Irobeni indicated that he saw his chiefly role as helping to educate his people about political issues rather than influencing them to vote for a particular candidate<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> Rikimae, J. A. Squatters want dispute solved. *Solomon Star*. 16 January 2006. ed. Honiara.

<sup>24</sup> Baetolingia, J. Grassroots network. *Solomon Star*. 23 March 2007. ed. Honiara.

<sup>25</sup> Wate, A. Election Campaign. *Solomon Star*. 19 October 2005. ed. Honiara.

<sup>26</sup> Wate, A. Chief Irobeni. *Solomon Star*. 25 October 2005. ed. Honiara.

## ANNEX 2: Name abbreviations of Interviewees

<b>Name</b>		<b>Position</b>
AA	Chief Angelita Anelo	Chief – Small Malaita
AB	Afu Billy	Regional Director, Commonwealth Youth Project
AP	Albert Palmer	Chief Justice
AW	Ashley Wickham	Peace and Integrity Council
BF	Billy Fa’arobo	Member of Provincial Assembly
BK	Beverley Komasi	Founder of schools at Burnscreek + various women near Ranadi dump
DL	David Leliana, Chief, Malaita	Custom Leader, Ngalikekero
FF	Fred Fono	Leader of the Opposition
FG	Father Gereia	Village Leader, Retired Priest
FK	Frank Kabui	Chairman of Law Reform & Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
GM	George Malefoasi	PS,M of Health &MS
GR	Gwen Ratu	Police
JD	Joanna Daiwo	Lecturer - SICHE
JF	Judith Fangalasua	SICA Federation of Women; Peace and Integrity council
JG	Father John Gereia, Malaita	Village Leader, Retired Priest
JT	Joses Tuhauku	
LH	Lisa Horiwapu	Director Vois blong Mere
MM	Michael Maena	National Provident Fund Prosecutor, Chair Small/Med Enterprises Council SI Vice-chair Business Council SI Owner of small security business
OP	Ollie Pokana	Project Manager Inclusive Communities Project, Church of Melanesia
PG	Paul Griffiths	RAMSI Program Director, Ministry of Police & Nat Security & Justice & Legal Affairs
PK	Sir Peter Kenilorea	Speaker to Parliament
PS	Father Peter Sina (Malaita CoM)	Deputy, Arch Bishop, Malaita
RH	Rick Hou	Governor , Central Bank of SI
RI	Richard Irosaea	Premier, Malaita
RR	Rev Riti	Gen Sec Solomon Is Christian Assn
SA	Sam Alasia	Special Secretary to Prime Minister
TK	Tony Krone	Legal Advisor
TW	Tony Wale (DSE)	Director DSE (Local NGO umbrella body)
VS	Val Stanley (CSP)	Community Strengthening Programme (AusAID)

### ANNEX 3 People consulted in Solomon Islands, Honiara Aug 2007

1	Rebekah Grindlay & Penny Bond	Acting High Commissioner Deputy Development Coordinator
2	Sam Alasia	Special Secretary to Prime Minister
3	Tim George &	Special Coordinator, RAMSI
4	Stuart Schaefer	Development Coordinator, RAMSI
5	Paul Griffiths	RAMSI Program Director, Ministry of Police & Nat Security & Justice & Legal Affairs
6	Sir Albert Palmer	Chief Justice
7	Rick Hou	Governor , Central Bank of SI
8	Sir Peter Kenilorea	Speaker to Parliament
9	Ollie Sandra Pokana	Project Manager Inclusive Communities Project, Church of Melanesia
10	Dr. George Malefoasi	PS,M of Health &MS
11	Afu Billy	Regional Director, Commonwealth Youth Project
12	Paul Peteru	Program Manager CYP
13	Rebecca Lineham	Second Secretary NZ high com
14	Georgiana Sagote'e & members	Women for Peace
15	Rev.Philimon Riti	General Secretary SI Christian Assn.
16	Gwen Ratu	Police
17	Justice Frank Kabui	Chairman of Law Reform & Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
18	Tony Wale	Director DSE (Local NGO umbrella body)
19	Lisa Horiwapu	Director Vois blong Mere
20	Rose Wale	Coalition on Education in SI
21	Judith Fangalasu	SICA Federation of Women
22	Judith Fangalasu	Peace and Integrity council
23	Ashley Wickham	
24	Mary Louise O'Callaghan	Public Affairs Manager RAMSI
25	Joses Tuhanuku	CEO Transparency SI
26	Tom Woods	Technical Advisor Constitutional Reform Unit, PM's office
27	Val Stanley	Community Strengthening Programme (AusAID)
28	Juliette Ket	Small business owner (former Educator)
29	Samson Maeniuta	Consultant (former Educator)
30	James Lalawa	Teacher, Honiara Town Council
31	Deborah Ro'ipata	Housekeeper
32	Joyce Rairitara	Housekeeper
33	John Kwate	Village elder
34	Angelita Anelo	Chief – Small Malaita
35	Lorio Sisiolo	Family Support Centre

36	Beverly Komasi	Founder of schools at Burnscreek + various women near Ranadi dump
37	Dr Joanna Daiwo	Lecturer - SICHE
38	Michael Lowe	Livelihoods Advisor, CSP
39	Joshua Kama	Youth
40	Lyn	Youth
41	Jenny Tuhaka	Deputy – National Council of Women/Soroprimists/Member of Constitutional review committee
42	Tony Krone	Legal Advisor
43	Mr Ron Thomas	Retired economist and adviser to former Minister of Finance in (1990s)
44	Ethel Puia	Former Secondary School Training Officer, EU Education project
45	Rachel Kaniko	Teacher, Honiara High School
46	Fred Fono	Leader of the Opposition



## ANNEX 4 Consultation Visits to Malaita Province Aug 2007

1	Richard Na'amo Irosaea	Premier Malaita Province
2	Harold Leka	Provincial Secretary, Malaita
3	Robert Suri	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Malaita
4	Father Peter Sina	Deputy, Arch Bishop, Malaita
5	Father Gereaa	Village Leader, Retired Priest
6	Claire R	WDD Officer, Malaita Province
7	Alice Baekalia	Girl Guide Leader
8	Beverly Ramo	Youth leader/teacher
9	Esther Iro	Women's Leader. Manakwai
10	David Leliana	Custom Leader, Ngalikekero
11	Bethezel Rodo	Mother, wife of Custom Leader
12	Rex Kafoigwa	Community High School Teacher
13	Delight	Teacher
14	David Iro	Volunteer Teacher
15	Noelyn Kwala	Villager
16	Margaret Mae	Trainee, RTC Teacher
17	Penuel Idusulia	Malu'u Community High School (CHS) Teacher/ Chaplain
18	Ilene Osina	Women's Band Leader
19	Alice Sikawaena	Women's Band Leader
20	Jeremy Raramo	Primary Head Teacher
21	Doris Bava	Church of Melanesia Trainer
22	Minnie Kiriau	Volunteer Coordinator- Social Development, CoM
23	Wilfred Tualakwau	Untrained Teacher, Busurata
24	Mary	Untrained Teacher, Busurata
25	Dr. Henry Daiwo	Pediatrician
26	Billy Fa'arobo	Member of Provincial Assembly
27	Focus Group (5 CHS girls)	Takwa Community High School
28	Francis Jack Kairi	Secretary To Independent Party
29	Michael Maena (from Honiara)	National Provident Fund Prosecutor, Chair Small/Med Enterprises Council SI Vice-chair Business Council SI Owner of small security business
30	Truck driver	

## **ANNEX 5 Consultations in Western and Makira Ulawa Provinces Sept/Oct 2007**

1	Chief Peter Ratusia,	Owens Seghe Lodge, Marovo Lagoon, Western Province
2	Many people who attended meetings held in 4 locations in Marovo	
3	Chief Joyce Murray	Owens Sanbis Lodge, Kirakira, Makira Province President Makira Council of Women
3	Bishop Alfred Karibongi	Bishop of Church of Melanesia Makira & Paramount Chief
4	Francis Wehi	Principal, Manivovo Rural Training College, Makira
5	Mrs Janet Siota	Villager, Santa Ana Island, Makira Ulawa Province
6	Many people who attended meetings held in 7 locations in Makira Ulawa Province	

Other people including villagers, taxi drivers and so forth also provided their insights and information about their lives in informal conversations though their names were not recorded.